In a dynamic setting, we compare procurement schemes in the form of a lump-sum payment with an optimal information-revealing menu o f c o n tracts without commitment. We nd that lump-sum contracts generate two bene ts. First, they always provide optimal levels of e ort. Second, they`tie the hands' of the procurer, and avoid the ratchet e ect. These bene ts must be weighed against the costs of higher rent in the second period. For a low discount factor such costs dominate, but for a high discount rate, when the ratchet e ect becomes acute, the welfare gap becomes small and lump-sum payments may e v en welfare-dominate an optimal menu. JEL Classi cation: L51
Introduction
The use of lump-sum contracts is common in many public sector procurement settings. These contracts provide a xed payment to suppliers in return for the realisation of a project, often of pre-speci ed size. For example, government departments and local governments typically receive lump-sum budgets to cover their own expenditure, and often distribute funds on a similar basis. Thus, in the UK for example, over $1.7 billion is allotted annually to central government departments under 3-year Departmental Expenditure Limits see 9 ; the Local Authority Revenue Grant provides key funding to local government; and government procurement guidelines emphasise the need to consider a full range of contracts, with price variation" being discouraged in some circumstances see 10 , para. 7.2. Departmental spending on core services can also involve lump-sum funding, as in the case of National Health Service GP Fundholders' budgets for drug prescribing see 1 , and current plans for legal aid contracting see 15 . Government agencies also make use of these lumpsum contracts: the UK Higher Education Funding Council funds universities in this way `buying' education for pre-speci ed numbers of students at each institution, and research grants invariably stipulate lump-sum funding. 1 In each of these cases, the funding body procurer is likely to su er information de cits about the supplier. These will relate to the underlying technology with which the procured projects are produced the quality of labour, computing equipment, etc. and the e ort put into keeping down costs. Such asymmetries will be particularly acute during the early phases of a procurement relationship, as with a newly elected local government, or in the early stages of a policy such as the legal aid proposals mentioned above. They are likely to beimportant, however, to the extent that they prevent the procurer from contracting at least cost and minimising the opportunity cost of raising and using public funds. For this reason, much recent procurement literature has, following 14 , focused on incentive compatible contracts that seek to separate suppliers on the basis of their anticipated e ciencies, and provide an element of cost-sharing between the procurer and less e cient suppliers.
However, as 19 observes, the procurer will often beunable to commit credibly beyond the current length of the procurement relationship so that, in multi-period settings with asymmetric information, the familiar`ratchet e ect' appears see 6 , 7 , 17 . As a result, over two periods, the outcome can be severely suboptimal and it is important to examine mechanisms which may help address this problem. The aim of our paper is to consider whether lump-sum contracts can help do this. Given the prevalence of such contracts in much public sector procurement, it is of interest to consider their welfare consequences; in particular, are there circumstances in which lump-sum transfers outperform complex mechanisms? 2 We perform our analysis in the context of the simplest dynamic procurement problem, as analyzed by 14 . We nd that lump-sum contracts, designed to ensure participation by the least e cient rm, generate two bene ts in relation to optimal cost-sharing contracts where the procurer cannot commit over time. First, unlike the latter, where e orts are distorted to reduce information rents, lump-sum contracts provide incentives to supply optimal levels of cost-reducing e ort. Second, since theỳ tie the hands' of the procurer, committing her to not learning about the supplier, lump-sum contracts can avoid the costs of the ratchet e ect. These bene ts must be weighed against the costs of higher rent in the second period. When these factors are combined in a dynamic setting, there is no a priori welfare ranking of the lump-sum scheme and optimal cost-sharing alternative in which the procurer optimizes in each period but cannot commit over the length of the relationship. For a low discount factor we can show that the costs of lump-sum payments outweigh the bene ts, but for a high discount rate, when the ratchet e ect becomes acute and induces a`Type III'equilibrium in La ont and Tirole's terminology, the welfare gap becomes small and lump-sum payments may e v en welfare-dominate an optimal menu.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the basic elements of the procurement game where the procurer faces the possibility of contracting a service from a rm that can be e cient or ine cient. Section 3 studies the static problem and makes welfare comparisons between lump-sum payments chosen to ensure the participation of ine cient rms and the optimal menu of contracts which i n volves some cost-sharing for these same ine cient rms. By design the latter must yield higher welfare and this section examines the factors that will increase this welfare gap. Section 4 turns to dynamic contracts where we assume that the procurer cannot, in the rst period, commit to the second period contract. Now the familiar ratchet e ect emerges and there is no a priori ranking for the lump-sum and menu with cost-sharing regimes. For lower discount factors the latter takes the form of a separating`Type I' equilibrium in which only the incentive compatibility of the e cient rm binds. In this case we show analytically that the period-by-period optimal menu w elfare-dominates the lump-sum regime. For higher discount factors this is no longer the case and the equilibrium is`Type III'where both rms' incentive compatibility bind. Using simulations we then show that the welfare gap between the optimal and lump-sum contracts closes sharply and can even become negative for some parameter combinations; ie, lump-sum payments can outperform the optimal menu. Section 5 provides conclusions and suggestions for future research.
The Procurement Game
We begin by setting out the basic elements of the procurement game in its most general form. There are 2 periods. The rm's costs are observed by the procurer and given by C t = , e t ; t = 1 ; 2 1 where e is e ort chosen by the rm and is an exogenous e ciency parameter. Neither e ort nor e ciency are observed so the procurer faces both an adverse selection and moral hazard problem. The procurer's prior of the e ciency parameter is distributed on interval ; . To keep the analysis manageable we restrict the distribution to a discrete two-type case, = with prior probability v 1 say. In 2, e t is the disutility of e ort in monetary units . In 3, S is the gross xed surplus of the project, r t is a cost-contingent reward paid by the procurer to the agent in addition to the cost C t and 1 + is the disutility again in monetary units arising from the opportunity cost associated with use of the procurer's scarce resources to fund C t + r t . 3 In 3 S , 1 + C t + r t is the net consumer surplus, and it is assumed that the procurer values consumer and producer surplus equally. 4 The procurer's problem can be regarded as choosing any t wo from four variables: transfers, costs, rents and levels of e ort for the two contracts she o ers to the rm, although the actual choice variable is the transfer conditional on costs. Throughout this paper we nd it convenient to formulate the problem in terms of choosing rent and e ort U t ; e t and U t ; e t .
Before we consider the equilibrium of this game with asymmetric information, it is useful to set the rst best, full information solution to the procurer's problem. Then e ciency and e ort are observed. Since social welfare given by 3 is decreasing in rent the optimal contracts must involve zero rent in each period. where is the procurer's discount factor.
The Static Problem
In this and the following sections we analyze the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the above procurement game, the appropriate equilibrium concept when the procurer is unable to commit over the two periods. This requires each player's moves to be optimal given their information and beliefs, and that beliefs are updated according to Bayes' rule. Employing backwards induction, we begin with the second period equilibrium, conditional on the procurer's beliefs v 2 . Of course this solution to the second period problem also gives us the static incentive scheme.
The Second-Period Equilibrium
The procurer designs contracts r 2 ; C 2 , and r 2 ; C 2 for low and high cost types respectively, given the updated probability 2 that the rm is e cient. This corresponds to e orts e 2 = ,C 2 and e 2 = ,C 2 . Suppose that the e cient low cost type mimics the ine cient t ype by producing at the observable high cost C 2 . It can do this by exerting e ort e 2 , =ẽ 2 , say, 5 where = , is the e ciency gap between the two types. Note that mimicking e ort by the e cient rm can benegative. Similarly the ine cient type can mimic the e cient type by exerting e ort e 2 + =ẽ 2 . The contracts o ered by the procurer must satisfy individual rationality IR and incentive compatibility IC constraints for each type of rm. These are I C 2 : r 2 , e 2 r 2 , ẽ 2 I C 2 : r 2 , e 2 r 2 , ẽ 2 I R 2 : r 2 , e 2 0 I R 2 : r 2 , e 2 0 I C 2 I C 2 says that the contract designed for type is the one preferred by type . Normalising the rm's reservation utility at zero, the IR constraints ensure participation by both types. Note that I C 2 + I R 2 I R 2 so we can ignore the latter. We also ignore I C 2 , and it is straightforward to check later that this in fact does not bind. Reformulating the relevant constraints in terms of rent and e ort gives I C 2 : U 2 U 2 + e 2 , ẽ 2 The solution to this problem is U 2 = e 2 , U 2 = 0 , e 2 = e , e 2 = e 2 v;; , the e orts being de ned implicitly by the rst order conditions Thus optimal static regulation entails a socially optimal level of e ort by the e cient rm who also enjoys positive rent, and a sub-optimal level of e ort but no rent for the ine cient rm. Costs are C 2 = , e and C 2 = , e 2 for the e cient and ine cient rms respectively with corresponding cost-contingent rewards net transfers given by: r 2 = , C 2 + e 2 = , C 2 + , C 2 , , C 2 11 r 2 = , C 2 12 
The Static Optimal Contract versus Lump-Sum Payments
Dropping the time subscript, the solution to the static one-o regulation problem is a pair of contracts implying rent and e ort U; e and U ; e for the e cient and ine cient rm respectively where U = e, U = 0, and e = e and e = ev;; are given by the rst-order conditions 9 and 10. Using these results we can establish the following: 
Proof See Appendix
Hence we have the proposition:
Proposition 1 Lump-sum payments are always inferior to the optimal contract in the welfare sense and become increasingly so as the probability the rm is e cient, the cost of public nance and the e ciency gap increase.
The intuition behind proposition 1 is as follows. The optimal menu can in principle o er the same lump-sum payment to both rms, so by design it must be superior. Lump-sum payments result in rent of the e ciency gap which from Lemma 1 iii we have seen exceeds the informational rent received by the e cient rm under the optimal menu. The cost of this rent rises as the cost of public nance rises. Its expected value rises as the probability the rm is e cient rises.
Dynamic Contracts
In the rst period, in general we m ust consider equilibria in which the e cient rm may mimic the ine cient and vice versa. Suppose that the e cient rm chooses the low cost contract with probability x and the high cost contract with probability 1,x. Similarly suppose that the ine cient rm chooses the high cost contract with probability y and the low cost contract with probability 1 , y. Then we have three possible types of equilibrium:
Type I: I C 1 and I R 1 bind and the e cient rm may mimic the ine cient rm with probability x.
Type II:I C 1 and I R 1 bind and the ine cient rm may mimic the e cient rm with probability y .
Type III:I C 1 , I C 1 and I R 1 bind and both rms may mimic the other.
14 Chapter 9 show that Type IIcannot beoptimal for the procurer, so we concentrate on equilibria of Types I and III.
FIGURE 1 HERE
Consider rst a Type IIIequilibrium. The extensive form of the game is shown in gure 1. 6 At information set A B a low high cost contract has been chosen by the rm in period one. Given these mixed strategies, the probabilities of arriving at A and B are: This completes the formulation of a Type III equilibrium. The computation of a Type I equilibrium now follows by dropping the constraint I C 1 , putting y = 1 and noting that information set A now becomes a singleton in gure 1, ie, 2 A = 1 .
Solution for Type I Separating Equilibrium
This sub-section completely characterizes a Type I separating equilibrium i.e. with x = 1 which we compare with the lump-sum scheme in the following sub-section. Of course equilibria are endogenously determined by the incentive s c heme which the procurer chooses to maximize its welfare function. However it is instructive t o f o c u s on the simplest equilibrium and we do examine later by simulations the parameter values for which it is relevant. In fact for all parameter values examined we nd in section 4 below that all Type I equilibria are separating, though for some parameter values the procurer may design contracts that result in Type III equilibria.
In a Type I separating equilibrium 2 A = 1 and 2 B = 0 and the secondperiod problem for the procurer is the complete information program set out in section 3. The solution is e 2 In equations 32 and 33, U 2 1 and U 2 0 are the second-period rents the e cient and ine cient rms respectively receive when they reveal their types; ie U 2 1 = U 2 0 = 0. U 2 0 is the second-period rent the e cient rm receives if it mimics the ine cient type in the rst period although this never happens in a separating equilibrium; ie U 2 0 = U 2 0+e 2 0,ẽ 2 0 = e 2 0 = e . Then using these results andŨ 1 = U 1 + e 1 from 24, we can write constraints I C 1 and I R 1 as I C 1 : U 1 U 1 + e 1 + e 34 I R 1 : U 1 0
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The nal discounted term in 34 is the familiar ratchet rent, the additional transfer the procurer must make to the e cient rm in the rst period to induce it to reveal its type. The equilibrium is illustrated in gure 2. This shows iso-transfer curves for the two t ypes of rm in rent-e ort space. As described earlier, the complete information equilibrium would involve e 1 = e 1 = 1, and zero rent for both rms: so the complete information equilibrium is at point A. Incomplete information allows the e cient rm to mimic the ine cient one by putting in less e ort ẽ 1 . Absent any dynamic considerations, the procurer counters this by reducing e 1 and r 1 , which in turn lowersẽ 1 and r 1 and, therefore,Ũ 1 : the equilibrium would beat B and D. However, in Type I equilibrium, the e cient rm surrenders in period 1 its chance to mimic again in period 2. Accordingly, the procurer must make an additional transfer to buy o this future`information rent'. This ratchet e ect moves the equilibrium to B and E and the ratchet rent is DE. 7 
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Lump-Sum Payments versus the Optimal Dynamic Contract
Consider a lump-sum payment L t in period t su cient to ensure that the ine cient rm's IR constraint holds. Proposition 2 Even in the absence of commitment, the optimal dynamic contract for a Type I separating equilibrium is superior to two periods of lump-sum payments provided that the equilibrium is Type I separating. The expected welfare di erence between the two schemes increases with v 1 , and Our analysis has weighed the bene ts and costs of lump-sum payments compared with optimal contracts without commitment. The bene ts are optimal e ort at all times by both types and the absence of the ratchet rent in the rst period. The costs arise from the higher second-period rent for the e cient rm. For a Type I separating equilibrium our welfare analysis shows that these latter costs outweigh the bene ts and that the welfare gap increases with parameters v 1 , and in the same way as that reported for the static contract in proposition 1.
Other Equilibria
The previous section examined one possible equilibrium, but there may beothers. In particular the Type I equilibrium may be semi-separating x 1 or the incentive compatibility constraint of the ine cient rm may bind, in which case we have a Type III equilibrium. This sub-section examines these possibilities using simulations. 8 We examine a baseline selection of parameter values = 1, = 1:5, = 0:25, v 1 = 0:5 for a discount rate 2 0; 2 with variations v 1 = 0:1 and = 1:5. We choose the functional form: e = 1 2 max0; e 2 . Choosing high values of the discount factor above unity is a way of introducing long-term considerations into the game without abandoning the convenience of a two-period set-up. For instance = 2 could represent a one-period contract in which the procurer built up a reputation for commitment to a longer second period contract. Alternatively the second-period contract could be deemed more important f o r a v ariety of reasons. 9 FIGURES 3 and 4 HERE. For low v alues of a T ype I separating equilibrium is obtained and as predicted from proposition 2 lump-sum payments are inferior to the optimal menu that is, G is positive. Proposition 2 also says that the inferiority o f the lump-sum scheme worsens as the probability the rm is e cient rises, and this is apparent from gures 3 and 4. For higher values of ratchet rent become very high as e cient rms become wary of revealing information that will prove costly in the increasingly important period two. The higher ratchet rent on o er induces the ine cient rms to mimic the e cient ones by exerting more e ort. Thus we arrive a t a T ype III equilibrium. Now the procurer may nd it better to design contracts that semi-separate rather than separate; i.e. to design a scheme with values of x and y below unity. Indeed our computations indicate that this is the case for v 1 low in gure 4. In e ect the procurer`commits' to less learning in period 1. The e cient rm then sometimes chooses a high cost contract and exerts low e ort and the ine cient rm does the opposite. This is far from rst-best behaviour and as a result the expected welfare under the optimal menu diminishes sharply. As we w ould expect from proposition 2 the relative performance of the lump-sum improves as v 1 falls because this scheme is rst-best if the rm turns out to be ine cient. Figure 4 shows that for a low v alue of v 1 where the rm is almost certainly ine cient, and a high discount factor then lump-sum payments actually welfare-dominate the optimal menu.
Conclusions
Lump-sum payments are commonly observed in procurement settings. This paper has examined under what circumstances constraining procurers to o er these payments can bealmost as good,or even better, than allowing them to design an optimal menu of contracts involving cost-sharing, when they have no other means to commit during the procurement relationship. The comparison between these two schemes leads to a trade-o . Lump-sum payments have the bene ts of pushing down production costs by making the rm the residual claimant over cost savings, and enabling the procurer to commit to not taking advantage of information revealed by the rm during early contract periods thereby removing the ratchet e ect. However, these bene ts are achieved at the social cost of the rent allowed to e cient rms, which an optimal menu of contracts is designed to reduce. We nd that this trade-o can be resolved in favour of either scheme. In particular, in a dynamic context where the discount factor is high and problems associated with the ratchet e ect are acute, there are circumstances where the latter may bewelfare-superior.
We have considered lump-sum procurement in the simplest context. However, a glance at government procurement guidelines indicates that additional considerations may play a role in this evaluation. First, a feature of many procurement settings is tendering. It is not clear that such`pre-contract' activity should in uence the forces at work in our analysis, but it does indicate the need to consider whether procurers can govern their procurement relationships by the threat of po-tential competition. Further, it is possible that contracts looking only for low-price supply may lead to an adverse selection in terms of the quality of bidders coming forward 21 provide an interesting example of this in the context of public defender contracts o ered by the US Legal Services Corporation.
Second, once the supplier has been chosen, the e ects of quality remain an issue. It is possible, for example, that lump-sum contracts may provide disincentives for the supply of unobservable, costly, quality, although the precise nature of this problem will vary from case-to-case, and may sometimes be dealt with by non-nancial means such as regular site inspections audits of government departments. Of course, if some proxies for quality can be observed, then performance indicators and penalties may be built into the contract, and lump-sum payment m a y remain appropriate for dealing with e ort incentives and the ratchet e ect.
Finally, contracts play an important role in the allocation of risk between parties. We have ignored this by assuming a deterministic environment see 11 , 16 , and by assuming risk neutrality for both procurer and supplier. In this context, it is interesting to note that the UK government's Private Finance Initiative regularly speci es lump-sum contracts in order to shift the risk of cost overrun onto suppliers.
Although the paper has focused on procurement, it's message may apply to a variety of circumstances: a simple mechanism involving a single policy instrument can`tie the hands' of regulators and may outperform an optimal menu where commitment is not possible. For instance, a commitment to a single price cap may lead to better outcomes than an optimal sliding scale of prices see 3 . Other simple mechanisms such as a single linear cost-contingent contract as assumed by 6 , 7 ; see also 20 might w ork in analogous fashion.
Clearly, the variety of outcomes that are possible in dynamic settings with noncommitment mean that di erent contracts will suit di erent circumstances: much work remains to be done. However, the apparently common use of relatively simple contracts suggests that further analysis of these contracts in such settings should provide valuable insights into the choices we observe.
A Proofs
A.1 Proofs for Lemma 1 i Follows from di erentiating e = e , e , and using the property 00 0.
ii Follows from 9, 10, 00 0 and i. 
